Abstract: Recent philosophical work attempts to understand irrational acts on the model of practical reasoning. Such acts are regarded as intelligible in the light of ordinary propositional attitudes which are nevertheless conjoined in a way that explains the irrationality. It is here argued that some irrational acts cannot be so understood; that they are not actions, per se; and that Freud's notion of "primary process", particularly in its emphasis on hallucinatory wish-fulfillment and on what he calls "omnipotence of thought", provides a useful description of such acts. Where hallucinatory wish-fulfillment (or phantasy) is operative, an anxiety or need causes an agent to see the world as one in which the anxiety-provoking state does not exist or has-somehow been dealt with satisfactorily. The need or Iack is not acknowledged, as it is when one can properly speak of desire and of a reasoning that attempts to implement it.
Despite his own wish to reduce mind to body -mentalistic explanations to purely physical ones -Freud dimished the sphere of human behavior that can be adequately described and explained in the language of physics alone. Phenomena that had seemed without psy~hic significance -for example, dreaming, various somatic symptoms, slips of the tongue and other such 'accidents' of daily life -are instead to be explained by reference to an agent's mental attitudes such as desire and belief.
Yet at the same time as Freud widened the domain of the mental, he radically changed our understanding of it. The psychic now includes a kind of thinking that is like desiring and believing (wishing, hoping for, rueing, remembering, predicting, pretending, and so on) but that cannot quite be rendered -as ordinary beliefs and desires can be -in straightforwardly propositional form. The behavior to be explained by such mental events is then in some ways like but also unlike action, construed as fully intentional behavior, behavior in which desire and belief mesh to form intention s.
The sort of thinking have in mind is what Freud names "primary process". In his biography of Freud, Ernest Jones calls this the most important aspect of Freud's discovery of the unconscious: "Freud's revolutionary contribution to psychology was not so much his demonstrating the existence of an unconscious, and perhops not even his exploration of its contents, as his proposition that there are two fundamentally different kinds of mental processes, which he termed primary and secondary respectively tagether with his description of them." (Jenes 1946, 436) Philosophers who are willing to talk about the unconscious in the first place usually neglect primary process altogether. Yet if there is such a thing, its nature requires, along with a different conception of thinking, a different model of irrationality than ones appropriate to such well-discussed species of it as self-deception.
In Part I, I explore the notion of primary process. This section will be both exegesis and interpretation, since Freud's remarks on the subject are often contradictory. I offer an account that I think makes the best sense of Freud an d of what I take to be the data in q uestion.
In Part I!, I briefly set out a currently influential model of irrationality and say how it needs to be amplified if there is, as I believe, something like primary process going on in our mental lives.
I.
Freud first develops the idea of primary process in his work on dreams where it is oll but interchangeable with the concept of "dreamwork". 1 He distinguishes two separate functions in mental activity during the construction of a dream: the production of the dream thoughts and their transformation into the manifest content. The secend operation constitutes the d reamwork, which provides the principles of dream intelligibility. These are "condensation", "displacement", "considerations of representability", and "secondary revision". I begin with the third, or with dreaming as a mode of thinking that is in some sense visual, since the thesis that dreams visualize the fulfilment of a wish is the key to understanding primary process. I should say that whether or not oll dreams are wish-fulfilling in Freud's sense is not my concern; rather, that there is a kind of thought process in which both the sleeping and the waking mind engage that "dreamwork" describes. It is related to wishful thinking, though that ph rase conju res u p a process more intrinsicall y rational than p rimary process. And unconscious wish-fulfilling phantasy, rooted as it is in anxiety, and anxiety of a primitive sort, has little to do with the phenomenon we typically think of as 'wishing'. On Freud's theory, the dream as representation of a wish as fulfilled is not easily recognized for what it is by the dreamer awake, partly because the wish is infantile, or connected by associations to one that is. As infantile, it is foreigri to the wishes and desires of the normal, conscious adult, though it remeins active in the dreamer's present mental life. Furthermore, the wish is surrounded by anxiety and is for that reason as weil scarcely identifiable as a wish. The thought of having the wish provokes anxiety. ( The granting of the child's Ionging for intimacy with his fother would req uire the child to be castrated OS he thinks his mether is •) Or the wish takes the particular form it does by answering an anxious thought, which is nevertheless still present in inchoate form. ( The child imagines intercourse per anum, which does not require castration. ) 2 And finally, the visual or fictive mode in which the representation takes place operates differently from language proper and from the thoughts it can express. As such an envisioning, the dream is the prototype of what Freud sometimes calls "hallucinatory wish-fulfillment" and sometimes unconscious "phantasy". Apropos of the adult, "phantasy" refers to a quasi-articulate scenario which preserves in broad structure some anxiety-provoking situation from the post and which one is ready to enact, en vision, or act out in the present in a way that (one imagines) sets things right. Dreaming provides Freud with the model for symptomatic acts of oll kinds, acts that have explanations in terms of something like beliefs and desires, but that are not done on purpose, though the agent herself may think they are; and that are irrational in a special sense.
As an example of such a symptomatic act, consider the much-discussed case of the middle-aged woman, long separated from her husband, who obsessionally runs every day into the room next to her bedroom, takes up a particular position beside a table, rings the bell for the maid, and then runs back into her bedroom, behavior as distressing and unintelligible to the woman as it is at first to Freud. As her story unfolds, the symptom is linked to her husband's impotence on their wedding night years before. Many times he had come from his bedroom to hers to try again, but without success. The next morning he had said angrily that he would feel ashamed in front of the housemaid when she made the bed, had taken up a bettle of red ink and poured it onto the sheet, but not on exactly the spot where a stain might have been appropriate. As Freud and his patient reconstruct her 'reasoning', she is, by repeating the scene, (unconsciously) 'correcting' it and putting it right in two ways: She is 'correcting' the placement of the stain, for if she calls the maid in to observe it, it must be in the right place. And she is 'correcting' her husband's impotence as well. Freud writes: "So the obsessional action was saying: 'l'lo, it's not true. He had no need to feel ashamed in front of the housemaid; he was not impotent.' It represented this wish, in the manner of a dream, as fulfilled in the present-day action ... " (Freud XVI, 263) As described by Freud, does what she did count as an action, behavior to be explained in terms of a pattern of beliefs and de'sires that constitute the reasons why an agent acts as she does? If so, we apparently have to impute to the woman something like the particular desire to revise her wedding night and the particular belief that running to the table and so on is a way of having her desire 1 and some general beliefs s u~h as that the post can be redone 1 that one can redo it by acting as if it had been the way one wishes it had been 1 that objects which resemble each other in some ways (like table cloths and bedsheets) are -as it were -functionally equivalent.
The difficulty with Freud's account is that these beliefs and desires are so strange as scarcely to qualify as beliefs and desires in the first place. It is one thing to ascribe a mental attitude to someone of which she is not aware at the time but which she would nevertheless find perfectly intelligible as a possible mental attitude. If I believe I have told you a hurtful truth out of concern for your welfare and someone suggests that I was retaliating for an injury I believe you have done me 1 I accept that as a motive someone might understandably have, whether or not I recognize it as mine in this instance. If you have in fact misled me and I believe you have done so intentionally 1 my belief may be unfounded and in that sense irrational, yet it is understandable to you as a belief. It is another thing, however 1 to ascribe to someone beliefs and desires so fundamentally odd, not only by our standards but also by hers 1 that neither we nor she would think they provided reason for doing anything whatever. 3
The fact that explanations like the one above cannot be accomodated to some version of the practical syllogism might seem a good reason for rejecting them out of hand as explanations of action. In a way I think this is right: so-called symptomatic acts are not actions per se. To an extent they are explicable in terms of beliefs and desires and insofar as this is so they are actions. But those symptomatic acts that instance hallucinatory wish fulfillment are to be explained by reference as weil to a mental state that does not acknowledge certain distinctions fundamental to rational action. Freud calls this state "omnipotence of thought" 1 an implicit theory of mind that credits wishing with the efficacy of doing.
It is illuminating to cantrast symptomatic acts performed under the aegis of omnipotence of thou ght with Straightforward cases of imagining. 4 The professional actor, for exampie 1 who behaves as if the world were in certain ways other than it is 1 knows the difference between belief and make-believe 1 between thinking about doing or pretending to do x 1 on the one hand, and doing or trying to do x on the other 1 between wishing that something were so and its being the case that it is. But it is just these distinctions that, a propros of her phantasizing 1 do not exist for the phantasizer. T he wis h -or the state of an xiety 1 Iack 1 or need -cau ses an imagining, and when it does, it is as if the desire were gratified. 5 In phantasizing one thinks in a mode that does not acknowledge such principles of rationality as those which describe inductive reasoning.
Freu d speaks of "wish" {"Wunsch") rather than of "desire" advisedl y, for compared to desire, even conscious wishing operates in relative freedom from the constraints of time, space, and reality generally. One can wishbut not desire -that the post had been different, that one were in two places at once, that things were other than one knows them to be; and for the having of things one knows it is impossible to have. In these ways wishing -but not desiring -can be counter-factual. Conscious wishingwishing one recognizes as such -is thus more complex than desire. But unconscious wishing is less complex in the sense that the wisher makes fewer differentiations. {Aristotle distinguishes wish from desire in ways similar to these in Book III of The Nicomachean Ethics. He is of course speaking about conscious wishes.)
One can consciously wish that the post had been different. One can unconsciously wish/believe that the post~ different. Freud's patient known os the Rat-Man { who was the one to describe his own state of mind as crediting thought with omnipotence) compulsively acts out a phantasy in which his fother is watehing him masturbate in front of a mirror. Only at the end of the analysis does Freud learn that, as the Rat-Man himself has known, the fother has long been dead {Freud X). The man wishes -but cannot be said to desire -that his fother were olive and that he were witness to the masturbatory act. His unconscious wishing produces a state of assertion expressed by "My fother is olive", though he does not consciously believe this to be so. Because of its relative indifference to reality, I would then call hallucinatory wish fulfillment a pro-attitude that has not yet achieved the logical str uctu re of desire. For the same reason -that the distinction between thinking p is true and wishing it were is blurred -the state of assertion in phantasy has not achieved the logical structure of belief.
Of course the wish is not truly gratified, nor would it be accurate to say one believes it is. This is the respect in which the wishing of phantasy is appropriately called "hallucinatory". One does not hallucinate -as one believes -that something is the case; one hallucinates the world as being a certain sort of way. To take a very simple example, Freud's dream that he is drinking water after having gone to bed in a state of thirst: while dreaming he does not believe p, that his thirst is satisfied, since in dreaming one is in no position to judge that p is true or false. Phantasy is a waking state in which one's affirmations are equally invulnerable to evidence.
Consider again the Rat-man, to whom the dreadful thought obsessively occurs that a terrible punishment, which he vividly imagines, is happening to his fother and his 'Iady'. Over the course of the analysis this thought emerges as a conflicted, aggressive wish, presenting itself at first as 'just a thought' -a propositional attitude which he does not recognize as his and in which the identity of the attitude is obscure. His own response to the proposition, however, is fascination and anxious guilt, which suggests something both about the character of his attitude and about his mental state, namely that for him it is as if what he envisions were about to come true, though he does not believe that it is, and indeed knows, in some sense, that it is not. If we were to describe this discrepancy as a conflict , between mental structures, then there is on the one hand a structure of beliefs and desires that are open to evidence and so subject to revision in the ordinary way, and on the other a structure of pro-attitudes and 'as-if' affirmations that are relatively closed to evidence. It is this second structure, hovering between 'would that the world were ... ' and 'this is how the world is' that I have been calling unconscious phantasy.
And just here is one of Freud's most important insights: that in general, no firm line can be drawn between belief and desire. They work weil enough as categories when we are dealing with normal adult thinking, though even so they are abstractions from a less tidy and more ambiguous process, as the systematic inter-dependency between belief and desire suggests.
A propros of phantasy the distinction breaks down altogether. What a normal conscious adult would properly describe as an act of wishing that p were so is in phantasizing closer to an act of believing that p is so, while assertion is closer to unconscious wishing, the primary process correlative of desire. For normal, adult, rational thou ght we can disting uis h the kind of affirmation that asserts p from the kind that says "Yea for p" or "would that p were so". Phantasy does not make this distinction.
By its nature phantasy must falsify reality in two ways: it mis-represents inner reality or the state of the agent, and it mis-represents outer reality or what he is doing in the world. 0 In Freud's thirst dream, for example, while thirsty the dreamer represents hirnself as gratified, and while suffering a desire he portrays hirnself as gratifying it. Intrinsic to the condition of phantasy is that it obscures what one is experiencing and doing, keeping both from explicit awareness. The wish remeins unrecognized, ungratified, and unmodified. And while it may disturb others of one's mental attitudes, it cannot qualify their content. Such con sciou s thou ghts, for example, as the Rat-man's "I Iove and admire and wish to honor my father" do not take into account the angry wish to dishonor and defy him, and the latter is not qualified by the Rat-Man's genuine if exaggerated feelings of affection.
If we think of rationality as that condition in which one acts in the light of all her beliefs and desires, and one's mental attitudes are spontaneously revised in the light of oll the others, then phantasy is inimical to rationality, since it blocks just that activity of confronting one belief, one desire, with all the rest. lt is inimical to learning from experience (which is part of what Freud means in speaking of a "repetition compulsion"). lt is inimical also to the forming of intentions in the sense in which an imagined, future state, valued as desirable, serves as an end, a purpose, or an aim of one's present activity, since a condition for forming such an aim is precisely that one recognize the imagined future state as something to be striven for, something not present now. Dewey describes the process of forming aims as "beginning with a wish, an emotional reaction against a state of things and a hope for something different. Action falls to connect satisfactorily with surrounding conditions. Thrown back upon itself, it projects itself in an imagination of a scene which if it were present would afford satisfaction. This picture is often called an aim, more often an ideal." (Dewey 1922, 234) The dim is a program for the future and an appraisal of the present, by which it is normally itself refined. The phantasizer, however, not recognizing the imagined scene or scenario as imaginary, is in no position to ask her self whether it would in fact be gratifying, nor of course to achieve it even if it would.
The condition of phantasy differs, then, from self-deception, which presupposes that one has first registered what one takes to be the truth. In phantasy an experience of anxiety or Iack produces an envisioning that forestalls the belief "I Iack what I desire". lnstead of the thought "x is desirable and I want it" -which requires acknowledging that one does not have it -a state of affairs is represented in which what there is, is what one desires. lf called to one's attention the desires are hard to recognize as such, furthermore, since they are archaic remnants from a period in which one was in the grip of erroneous beliefs about the world and of anxieties out of keeping with anything now regarded as a danger.
Even the more ordinary devices of phantasy are not those of self-deception but of wishful thinking: failure to make what one knows generally more specific, to question oneself about a contemplated action or an apparent desideratum, to gear desire to the details of observed reality. 7
Phantasy is then a species of proto-desire, operating under a primitive theory of the mind, in a mode characterized by condensation, displacement, and secondary revision, mechanisms weil illustrated by the phantasy told to Freud by four different female patients, in which a child is being beaten. In each case the phantasy is perfectly conscious and accompanied by intense sexual excitement, which provides a clue to the character of the attitude.
Also in each case the terms of the phantasy, who is beating whom, are obscure. Was the child being beaten the one producing the phantasy or another? Was it always the same child? Who was it who was beating the child? "Nothing could be ascertained ", Freu d writes, "that th rew an y light upon oll these questions-only the hesitant reply: I know nothingabout it: a child is being beaten ... Un der these circumstances it was impossible at first even to decide whether the pleasure attaching to the beatingphantasy was to be described as sadistic or masochistic." (Freud XVII b, 181) -One might describe this as another instance, then, of a propositional attitude in which the identity not only of the variables but also of the attitude itself is obscure.
As the phantasy is slowly spelled out, it is revealed to reflect wishes and anxieties interacting with each other from different periods of the phantasizer's life, oll of the wishes and anxieties preserved in the structure of the phantasy. It expresses, and condenses, a number of transformations: in the first instance, the child who is being beaten is a rival ( brother or sister, if there is one) for the father's Iove, and the beating is a proof that the phantasizer is his preferred Iove object. Then under the influence of the guilt which the child came to feel -through omnipotence of thought -for her incestuous wishes, the child being beaten becomes the girl herself, and the motive for the transformation is punishment for the guilty wish. This does not mean, however, that the first motive is replaced. The phantasy expresses the jealous wish, and simultaneously the punishment for it, and something eise as weil, though Freud does not explicitly say so here: a symbolic representation of the act of intercourse as understood by a child and colared by her feelings of guilt.
By "condensation" Freud means then, the convergence of a number of different meanings on a single idea. With regard to dreams, it is the mechanism of dreamwork responsible for the highly laconic expression of the manifest dream in comparison with the dream interpreted, a brevity that might be accounted for as an act of omissioni but dream interpretation reveals instead that images and thoughts in the manifest content of the dream are compressed allusions to many others.
"Condensation" is a misleading term, for it suggests that the dreamer/ phantasizer takes thoughts, ideas, images, which she considers to be distinct, and conflates them into a single idea. lnstead, as in A Child ls Being Beaten, the thou.ghts have not been spelled out in the first place. They are inherently ambiguous. And this ambiguity accounts, in part, for the mechanism Freud calls "displacement": for thoughts and thought-fragments that are not spelled out and discriminated facilitate a slippoge of significance and weighting from one to the other.
Freud says that condensation serves the purpose of disguise, but that it is not neces saril y motivated b y that pur pose. ( Certainly one does not dream on purpose.) It is simply the way the mind works in certain of its states in dreaming, in the creative process, and in phantasy. 8 He does not say of displacement that it, too, may serve the purpese of disguise but is not necessarily generated by it. But because of the kinship between displacement and condensation, both should be characterized in the same way.
About whether or not dreamwork is to be regarded as a translation of another message, one that can be rendered in straightforwardly propositional form, Freud vacillates. As the vehicle of repression, dreamwork is presumably such a translation, and so parasitic on ordinary thought. But to regard it as always so would be inconsistent with Freud's other idea that primary process is the first form that thinking takes. It remeins available for repression and so in practice is entangled with secondary process thoughts but is nevertheless thinking of a different order. The Ietter is the line I have been following, that to characterize primary process as ordinary beliefs and desires, logically inter-related in the ordinary ways, cannot help but mis-characterize its content and its structure. Dream interpretation -and the same is true of phantasy -is a matter of evoking the emotional world of the dreamer as a child, and in that setting, giving the dream thoughts an articulate form they did not have.
Yet the dream can be told, and presents itself as a kind of narration. That this is so argues for a continuity between primary process and ordinary waking thought. Freud posits the fourth mechanism of dreamwork -secondary revision -to account for the fact that the dream must cantein the conditions of its own narratibility. Secondary revision would seem to be a kind of editing in the direction of rational discourse. A closer Iook at narrative reveals, however, that intrinsic to it are features facilitating condensation and displacement, which suggests that no more can a fast line be drawn between primary and secondary process than between belief and desire.
Think again of A Child ls Being Beeten and of its ambiguity with regard to crucial details like who is agent and who is victim, why the child is being beaten, and who is watching. Narrative itself allows for such ambiguities, both because it can shift its point of view, looking at the same events from the vontage of different agents, at the agents as they are seen from the outside, at the world as it appears to different agents; and because it must present events sequentially: What is given as mere temporal sequence leaves open the question of logical structure, whether the events occur in the order they do as cause to effect, plan to execution of plan, crime to punishment, and so on. 9 8oth the narrative in which the dream seems to unfold, and the narrative in which one unfolds the dream in the later telling of it, allow it to express different (and even in some sense incompatible) thoughts simultaneously.
The dream is of course not identical with the waking narration that puts it into words. Yet the narratibility of the dream provides an argument for thinking of dream activity as a species of the mental. Narretion involves mental processes. And it would be odd if the dream were a disjunctive activity such that in its final but not its earlier stages mental causes are at work. 10
In its topographical sense "the unconscious" is interchangeable in some of Freud's writings with the concepts of primary process and also of the Id. In such contexts, "Id" cannot be a name, then, for some "boiling cauldron" of instinctual energlf since such a concept is presumably in the domain of neuro-physiology. It may weil be that for every mental event there is in principle a description of it in physical terms. But I take mental descriptions to be irreplaceable by and irreducible to physical descriptions, and indispensable to explanations of human behavior as actions, things done intentionally, for reasons. Primary process, phantasy, and the acting-out or quasi-actions that it explains, are also such irred ucibly mental descriptions.
Primary process enters into accounts of irrationality not by providing substructures of attitude that are perfectly intelligible in the ordinary way, but by invoking attitudes sufficiently like belief and desire to count as mental phenomena, yet unlike them in being less articulate and articulable. The behavior they explain is motivated and purposive, but it is not intentional in the sense in which we speak of someone's having done soand-so intentionally.
Freud thought primary process to be "primary" in two senses: it is chronologically first, and it persists in the adult mind as a more primitive kind of thinking than the ones we normally honor with the name of "thought". As for the genetic hypothesis, it is plausible to assume some continuity between the pre-verbal, pre-conceptual attitude towards the world of the child who will soon become a language user in the full sense. Inarticulate attitudes which perhops for that reason cannot yet be said to have the status of beliefs and desires may shade imperceptibly into attitudes that do. While there may be decisive turning points in the acquisition of language, they are likely to be decisive only more or less, with pre-linguistic experience surviving as memory in some form, qualifying the content of later articulate mental attitudes. By the same token memodes of early experience are subject to revision by later ones. This is how learning takes place. But as Freud points out, it also means that memories of experiences which were not traumatic at the time may become so in light of a meaning which they only retroactively acquire (Freud XVII a) . The recovery of the post which is a part of the therapeutic process is then an uncovering of a causal history which did not merely precede a present mental attitude in time but which also now informs it.
It is the essential characteristics of primary process that make it plausibly the first mode of mental functioning: condensation might characterize just those thought processes not yet in full control of language 1 with the discrimination s it both allows an d enforces; the beliefs or proto-belief s that are a typical part of the structure of unconscious phantasies are ones that might fit a child's view of the world; and finally omnipotence of thought might be a theory of mind just for one not yet able consistently to distinguish act of awareness from object of awareness 1 what is immediately subject to the control of volition (like the movements of one's own body 1 normally) from what is not 1 nor able yet to tolerate a delay of gratification. In primary process thinking 1 therefore 1 what will later become desire and belief are not yet so distinct.
As for the primitive character of primary process thought 1 it is a structure of wishes rather than desires 1 and illusions rather than beliefs; events are seen to be related as wish to gratification of wish 1 crime and punishment 1 good deed and reward 1 rather than as cause to effect more generally; and it is characterized by condensation and displacement. It implies a view of reality 1 furthermore 1 that can be spelled out in terms of a few basic proto-beliefs fundamentally different from those underlying normal waking thought. I have spoken about one 1 omnipotence of thought. There are others: As rational agents we believe that one cannot literally read another's mind in the way one can literally read a book; that material objects endure through space and time whether or not they are out of one's own sight and mind; that changes in physical objects cannot be explained in terms of mental events alone; and that the only physical object even apparently under the immediate control of the will is one's own body 1 some of the time. Beliefs contrary to these are evident in schizophrenia. I believe 1 with Freud 1 that they are also apparent in the phantasy-lives of ordinary neurotic adults.
II.
There are many things we might mean in calling a thought process or an action irrational that do not involve paradox. The sort that does 1 and that therefore makes conceptual difficulty for a theory of action -Davidson points out -is the failure of coherence within a single person in the pattern of her desires 1 beliefs 1 actions 1 and so on. The paradox is engendered by the fact that desires 1 beliefs 1 and the actions they explain 1 are distinguished and identified only by their logical relations with each other 1 relation s which simply define what we mean by "rationality" in the broad sense. These logical relations are describable in terms of certain over-arching principles such as 'Believe that proposition for which there is the greatest amount of evidence' 1 and 'Perform the action you think would be best 1 all things considered'. We must then ascribe such over-arching principles of rotionolity to onyone whose behavior we wish to describe and explain as actions in the first place. The problem is that weakness of the will and self-deception seem to be cases precisely of not believing or acting in accord with the over-arching principles of rationality or coherence. As Davidson puts it: "The difficulty in explaining irrationality is in finding a mechanism that can be accepted as appropriate to mental events and yet does not rationalize what is to be ex plained." ( David son 1984) One of Davidson's examples of irrationality is a variation on an incident from Freud's case-history of the Rat-Man. Here is the example as Davidson teils it: "A man walking in a park stumbles on a branch in the path. Thinking the branch may endanger others, he picks it up and throws it in a hedge beside the path. On his way home it occurs to him that the branch may be projecting from the hedge and so still be a threat to unwary walker s. He gets off the tram he is on, returns to the park, and restores the branch to its original position. Here everything the agent does (except stumble on the branch) is done for a reason, a reason in the light of which the corresponding action was reasonable. Given that the man believed the stick was a danger if left on the path, an d a desire to eliminate the danger, it is reasonable to remove the stick. Given that, on second thought, he believed the stick was a danger in the hedge, it was reasonable to extract the stick from the hedge and replace it on the path. Given that the man wanted to take the stick from the hedge, it was reasonable to dismount from the tram and return to the park. In each case the reasons for the action tell u s what the agent saw in his action, they give the intention with which he acted, an d they thereb y give an explanation for the action. such an explanation must exist if something a person does is to count as an action at all." (Davidson 1982a, 292) What the man did was nevertheless irrational, Davidson continues, because though he had a motive (a reason) for removing the stick, and a motive for returning to the park to restore it, he had yet another motive for not returning, namely the time and trouble it would cost him. Presumably in his own judgment the latter consideration was not just one reason among others, but the consideration that outweighed the rest. Yet he acted contrary to his own best judgment. "What needs explaining is not why the agent acted as he did, but why he didn't act otherwise, given his judgment that all things considered it would be better." (Davidson 1982a, 296) On the model Davidson provides, the irrational step in the sequence leading to akrasia or self-deception is the drawing of the boundary that keeps inconsistent beliefs apart. In particular it is the requirement of total evidence, or the principle that teils us to act in accord with our best judgment, that must be walled off. "What causes it to be thus temporarily exiled or isolated is, of course, the desire to avoid accepting what the requirement counsels. But this cannot be a reason for neglecting the requirement. Nothing can be viewed as a good reason for failing ro reason according to one's best standards of rationality." (Davidson 1985 ) Thus
Davidson's model purports to show how an action can be rational in the general sense required for it to count as an action in the first place, yet irrational in some more specific sense.
The irrationality is explained in terms of sub-sets of propositional attitudes perfectly coherent in themselves, but conjoined, or disjoined, so as to permit the ir rationality.
Freud also thought that some kinds of irrationality are to be described in such a way. He called them "splits in the ego". In one of the many texts that could be cited here he writes: "The study of hypnotic phenomena has accustomed us to a bewildering realization that in one and the same individual there can be several mental groupings, which can remain more or less independent of one another, which can 'know nothing' of one another and which can alternate with one another in their hold upon consciousness .
•. lf, where a splitting of the personality such as this has occurred, consciousness remeins attached regularly to one of the states, we call it the conscious mental state and the other, which is detached from it, the unconscious one." (Freud XI, 19) This is the notion of "the unconscious" in what Pears calls a "functional" sense, where the line between conscious and unconscious is drawn to reflect the interactions between a person's mental attitudes rather than his consciousness of them per se (Pears 1984) . Neither sense corresponds to primary process, and it is the unconscious as primary process that Freud implicitly invokes to explain the Rat-Man's compulsive-obsessive behavior.
Here is the incident of the man in the park as Freud teils it.
"One day, when he was out with her ( his lad y) in a boat and there was a stiff breeze blowing, he was obliged to make her put on his cap, because a command had been formulated in his mind that nothing must hoppen to her. This was a kind of obsession for protecting, and it bare other fruit besides this ..
• On the day of her departure he knocked his foot against a stone lying in the road, because the idea struck him that her carriage would be driving along the same road in a few hours' time and might come to grief against this stone. But a few minutes later it occurred to him that this was absurd, and he was obli~ed to go back and replace the stone in its original position on the road." Freud X, 189-90) On Davidson's description, given the man's belief that the stone was a danger and his desire that the Iady not be harmed, it was reasonable to remove the stone. But reading on in Freud's telling of the story we understand that the man hirnself thought this belief absurd; that the stone -in his own eyes -could not realistically be perceived as a danger; and that it seemed one to him at first only because he was in the grip of a phantasy involving infantile rage at both his Iady and his fother, rage operating under the aegis of omnipotence of thought. He saw the stone as dangeraus because of his wish that someone be harmed, a wish contrary to the one on which he believed he acted. The wish that someone -Iady and fother condensed into one -be harmed, caused the quasi-belief that someone would be harmed, which provided the reason for acting so as to prevent the wish from coming true.
In Freud's version this is another case of hallucinatory wish-fulfillment in action -a bit of phantasy acted out. The irrationality comes lang before that ignoring of the principles of rationality that Davidson invokes. While I agree with Davidson that we might analyze the man's behavior in terms of conflicting sub-structures of mental attitudes, I think that the conflicting structures are not on the same footing. The division is not such as to allow the man to ignore principles like that of total evidence, for one structure is relatively oblivious to evidence in the first place. It is walled off, not from the principle of total evidence, but -relatively -from the requirement for any evidence. It interferes with other structures not as counter-argument to argument, but as phantasy interferes with realistic assessment of reality and the desires and beliefs that are qualified by it.
now want to modify my earlier account of phantasy to include the notions, first, that the operative phantasies in a person's life are not occasional, sporadic, and thematically unconnected, but form a schema on which particular phantasies are variations. An example of such a schema is A Child Is Being Beaten. (Freud does not construct the Rat Man's various phantasied into a schematic form, but he suggests the elements.) Second, the themes and dominant emotions are inter-personal: envy, jealousy, conflicts between the desire for gratification and the fear of another's anger or of disapproval. That the themes are of such a primitive inter-personal sort teils us to Iook for a world-view in which events are seen to be related in a very particular causal way, as gratification to demand, punishment to guilt or 'badness', reward to 'goodness'. That the phantasies are connected guides us to Iook at a number of odd behaviors in the person's life as reflected in the light of each other. The Rat Man's b u sines s with the stone s hau ld be ju x taposed wit h his ritual before the mirrar, with his 'obsession for protecting', with the 'rat' punishment itself, behaviors that are of a piece in feeling alien to the agent and in having a stereotypical character which suggests a repetition of something in the post. All explanations of action -or quasi action -must find that view of the world as seen by the agent from which his doings make sense: one sees the sense they made to him, which is to say one sees that they would make sense to oneself if she had beliefs and desires like the agent's. Where primary process thinking is involved, as it is apt to be in behavior with an obsessive-compulsive character, the world-view is extraordinary by our normal adult standards, and the 'reasons' that the agent gives for his behavior -as with the Rat Man -are apt rather to be rationalization in Freud's sense, a sincere but mistaken attempt to fit one's behavior to the patter n of rational action.
One implication of the view I am suggesting is that there are thingsi that Iook like self-deception but which are not. Self-deception presupposes attitudes such that one could recognize discrepancies between them were one in a position to do so, and requires postulating something like a barrier between mutually inconsistent groups of attitudes to account for the fact that apparently one is not in that position. In phantasy the identity of the attitudes is to begin with unclear, as is the fact that they are one's own. What may seem like fear may turn out to be a wish as weil. And an idea may present itself as simply 'passing through one's head' rather than as a thought one is thinking. The attitudes are internally incoherent and condensed, so that notions like "consistency" and "inconsistency" do not yet apply.
We could summarize these differences by saying that the notion of intrapsychic conflict genuinely applies to instances of self-deception, whereas the nature of phantasy is such as to preclude not only the acknowledgment of conflict but even conflict itself. The transition from self-deception to greater rationality is made by juxtaposing internally coherent but mutually incompatible attitudes so that some integration among them can be made (e.g. I wish for x but am afraid of the consequences of having it, and my fear outweighs my desire). The transition from phantasizing to greater rationality is made by stopping the movement to phantasy -however that is done -so that one feels and recognizes the state of need or Iack one is in. This may require a greater tolerance for anxiety, frustration, and psychic pain than one had before. I say it may require it because the line between a morally reprehensible cowardice and a morally neutral intolerance for pain is as hard to draw as the line between primary process thinking and self-deception. Not es 1) Freud's most extended discussion of dreamwork is of course in The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud IV/V).
2) This example comes from the case history of 'the Wolf Man' (Freud XVII a).
3) Such difficulties in typical psychoanalytic explanations as these are discussed by Alexander 1962, and in Misehel 1965. 
